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Standing in the last ditch: on the communicative 
intentions of fiction-makers1 
Pre-publication version of a paper which appeared in the Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 72: 351Ȃ
363 
 
Philip Sydney, well known for having said that the poets assert nothing and so do not lie, 
added rather unhelpfully that they tell us what should or should not be, rather than what 
is. Perhaps Sidney was responding to the thought that it is not enough to say what fiction-ǯǡȋmost saliently) the making of assertions; we need an account 
of what they do.2 Agreed, but we      ǯǤ Poets (aka fiction-
makers) do not always engage in advocacy or moralising, they engage in it less, probably, 
than authors of nonfiction do, and where they do it is usually much more indirect than 
telling. Some of us have suggested that what fiction-makers do is offer us things to 
imagine, that this is what is distinctive of fiction and what distinguishes it from narrative-
based but assertive activities such as journalism or history.  
Offering people things to imagine can be done in different ways. I might offer you 
something which, as a matter of fact, is an appropriate vehicle for imagining; perhaps it 
would not then matter to the fictional status of what is on offer that I intended it to be 
used in that way. Or my act of offering might make it clear that my intention is that it be 
used in that way; perhaps it is that manifestation of intention that is crucial. Kendall 
Walton emphasises the first way, holding that what matters for our judgements about 
fiction is whether the thing functions to authorise imaginings, not whether it was 
intended to do so.3  ǡ       ǯ ention which confers 
                                          
1 An earlier version of this paper was given at the Richard Wollheim memorial lecture at the annual meeting 
of the American Society for Aesthetics, San Diego, October 2013. I am grateful to the society for the 
opportunity to return to this topic after a number of years, and to a number of people in the audience on 
that occasion for their comments, especially Neil van Leeuwen whose comment made me see a weakness 
in the defence I was offering. I am grateful also to Stacie Friend for a number of helpful discussions of this 
issue and for the insightful papers she has written on this topic, and to Anna Ichino for comments on an 
earlier version.  
2 ǲǳǡot Ǥǲȏ-maker] recount things not true, yet because he telleth them not for ǳȋDefence of Poesie, first published 1595, p.66 of the 1891 Cassell & Company edition). 
Perhaps assertion is a particularly strong form of saying, below which would come such things as 
suggesting and hypothesising, and Sidney is surely to be understood as denying that fiction-makers put 
forward what they say as in any way a candidate for truth.  But for the sake of simplicity I will contrast 
fiction-making only with assertion in what follows.  
3 Walton might say that to be a fiction-maker one must intend what one offers to serve as a guide to 
imagining, and it must be true that it does so serve, but that things can be fictions via other routes, in which 
case they are fictions without fiction makers. Or he might say that one can be a fiction maker in virtue of 
crafting a story-telling artefact which comes to be used as a guide to imagining even though one does not 
intend it to be so used. What those two positions have in common is that there are fictions which are not 
the product of the intention to make fiction. 
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fictional status.4  My view is parallel to the view of Wollheim on depiction.5 We may see a 
face in many thingsȄclouds, paintings, frosted windows. But of these only paintings are 
depictions, because only they are intended to be such that something is seen in them. 
Similarly, we may treat the Bible, Middlemarch, or a language-like combination of erosion 
marks as a guide to imagining. But of these only Middlemarch is a fiction because only it 
is intended by its maker to be a guide to imagining.  
Many, I think, feel the intuitive appeal of this idea at the same time as they sense looming      ǯ     the 
identification of fiction with the to-be-imagined. I will formulate a very weak version of 
the proposal which is not vulnerable to some objections recently presented. But while 
this version is weak it is also quite precise, and its precision brings into view certain other 
problems which have not so far been attended to. To the extent that these problems are 
serious, the prospects for an intentional theory of fiction lookǡǯ sorry to say, poor; the 
version susceptible to the objections is weak, and anything weaker still but not so 
susceptible could hardly be thought of as a theory of fiction, though it might supplement 
such a theory.  
1. Grice 
The theory I advocate observes the principle, associated with Grice, that communicative 
acts are individuated by the communicative intentions of their agents. Grice did not 
endorsed or even (so far as I know) consider the theory, but it may be well to spend a 
moment thinking about what Grice said that might be relevant to this. Two things he said ǣȋȌǲǳǢǲǡǡǤǳ6 Since for 
Grice saying P entails meaning P, which requires the intention to induce or activate the 
belief that P, or at least the belief that the speaker believes P, we should say that a fiction-
maker does not say that Holmes lived at 221b Baker Street, but merely makes as if to say 
this.7 We might leave it an open question whether there are forms of making as if to say 
P which do not count as cases of pretending to say that P, but pretending is surely one 
way. Perhaps then the most authentically Gricean view of fiction that we have is that of 
                                          
4 ǲǳǡProceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society, 28 (1954): 171).  The view is developed in Chapter 1 of my The Nature of Fiction (Cambridge 
University Press, 1990); see references there to related views. See also Lamarque, Peter and Stein Haugom 
Olsen 1994: Truth, Fiction, and Literature: A Philosophical Perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press; ǡ   ? ? ? ?ǣ ǲ	   	ǳǤ British Journal of Aesthetics 36, pp. 43-55; ǡǡǲ	ǳǡAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 85 (2011): 
145- ? ? ?Ǥ
ǯThe Mess Inside, Oxford University Press, 
2012. Views of this kind usually go with some limitation on the extent to which, or the way in which, a work 
of fiction can be true (see e.g. The Nature of Fiction, p.46). It will not distort the present argument to ignore 
this here. 
5 ǡ ǲ ǡ     ǳǡ  Art and Its Objects, Second edition, 
Cambridge University Press, 1992. 
6 See Grice, Studies in the Way of Words, 30-31, 54. 
7 	     
ǯ          ǡ   ǡ ǲ 
     ǳǡ Linguistics and 
Philosophy, 15 (1992): 509 - 559.  
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Searle, who has argued that fiction makers do not make assertions: rather, they 
(nondeceptively) pretend to make them.8 That view is different from the view I am 
defending here, which is that when fiction-makers  ǲǳ  manifest Gricean 
intentions that we imagine P, and the manifestation of these intentions makes their 
utterances (real) cases of fictive utterances, and not cases of pretend assertive utterances.      ǯ   ǡ    a reasoned 
decision could be made between them. To them I say that my defence of the view I call 
Intentionalism serves equally well (and, ultimately, equally badly) as a defence of the ǲ-ǳǡ
important provision that the purpose of the pretend utterances constitutive of fiction is 
to get the audience to imagine what the speaker pretends to assert.9 That granted, one ǡǡǲǳ ǡ  ǲ        ned 
immediately    ǳǤ   ǡ 
believe, under that more inclusive reading as well as it does under the restrictive reading 
confined to the first disjunct. 
Since I have mentioned Gricean intentions I 
ǯ
views by way of background to the present project. Grice argued that in order to mean 
something by what one does, one must (i) intend     ǯ
intention to affect them in a certain way, and (ii) intend to achieve that effect partly by 
means of their recognition of that intention. This requirement of a reflexive intention has 
proved controversial and Grice and others have proposed a number of amendments to 
the requirement, some of them quite complicated.10 Others have sought to simplify rather 
radically. Sperber and Wilson point out that once intention (i) is satisfied communication 
has taken place; the addition of intention (ii) is an attempt to draw a sharp line between 
cases of merely showing, for which (ii) fails, and cases of genuine telling where (ii) holds. 
They argue that there is no such dividing line but rather a continuum of cases all of which 
fall within the theoretically more interesting class of what they call ostensive-inferential 
communication.11  ǯ      ǡ   
question that engages meȄcan we give an intentionalist account of fiction?Ȅdoes not 
                                          
8 Searle, The logicaǳǡExpression and Meaning, Cambridge University 
Press, 1979. 
9 Searle does not discuss this audience-focused aspect of fictive communication though he does, at the end ǡǲe and effort to texts which contain largely pretended speech Ǥǳǡǡǲǡǡ
human life, and the equally crucial role that shared products of the imagination pǳ
(ibid, 332). Searle is thinking here about ways in which pretended utterances serve to convey serious 
messages, and is not making a point about the value that imagining has in itself. But the presumption seems ǯs picking up of serious messages from fictions is mediated by acts of imagining on their 
part, an idea which comports well with the provision I suggest above that we add to his theory.  
10 ǤǤ
ǡǲǯǳǡ ?Studies in the Way of Words, Harvard 
University Press, 1989. I based the account in The Nature of Fiction on a version due to Kent Bach & Robert 
M. Harnish, 1979. Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts. Boston: MIT Press. 
11 See Relevance, Chapter 1, Second Edition, Blackwell, 1995, Section 10. Sperber and Wilson introduce a 
number of other changes to the Gricean account, resulting in a radically different theory.   
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ǯǤt, 
the arguments that I will consider below do not so depend. When I speak, in what follows, 
about the communicative intentions of a fiction maker, I have in mind the minimally 
ǯd imagine 
some proposition be recognised.  
Grice also advocated a distinction between what is said and what is implicated, and 
developed a taxonomy of implicatures, as he called them.12 Later in this paper I will draw 
on these ideas.  
2. Supervenience 
In defending the Intentionalist view I argued that we should take the basic unit of fiction 
not as the workȄthe novel, sayȄbut as the utterance. Utterances are productive of 
works; one produces a novel by engaging in certain acts of utterance.13 And utterances 
have a finer structure than works; a work is usually the product of many utterances and 
it is natural to think that the many utterances that are productive of something we are 
happy to call a fiction need not all be fictional. But an utterance itself can easily be wholly 
fictional; it is so when what is communicated by means of that utterance is produced with 
a certain intention: the intention that the hearer/reader imagine, rather than believe, 
what is communicated. Many such utterances can easily be identified in works we call ǡǯ
assertion. Nor do I say that all utterances associated with a fiction are wholly fictive or 
wholly non-fictive. The one below, which we can think of as appearing in a slightly arch ǡǯ:  
1. Emily, being a heroine in a romantic novel, lived happily ever after.14 ǯ
that she was a heroine in a novel. It is not easy to say what is going on in such cases, which 
seem to involve odd collisions between what is trueȄthat Emily is fictional--and what is 
part of the storyȄthat she lived happily ever after. But we need worry about this, as I will 
show in a moment.  ǯǤ
have a work F, produced by a sequence of utterances. The intentional profile of the work 
will specify everything relevant about the communicative intentions behind those 
utterancesȄwhether we are supposed to imagine or believe something and what it is we 
are to imagine or believe, or whether perhaps the utterance is intended to produce both 
effects, or whether it is indeterminate what the intention is, or that no coherent account 
                                          
12 Grice, ǲLogic and Conversationǳ, in Studies in the Way of Words.  
13 For the sake of simplicity I individuate utterances sententially: each sentence in the text counts as one 
utterance. For certain purposes we may need more complex ways, some of which would involve expanding 
a given sentence of the text into two or more seǤǯǤ 
14 For more subtle examples of this kind see the final pages of Northanger Abbey. 
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of the intention can be given (see 1 above). Now we might say of a work that it is fiction, 
or that it is nonfiction, or that it is largely fiction or non-fiction, or that it is about equally 
both, or that it is indeterminate what its status is. Whatever of this kind it is correct for 
us to say about F will be its fictional status (so having a fictional status is not at all the ȌǤǣǯ
status supervenes on its intentional profile. Or: works with the same intentional profile 
have the same fictive status. Or we might give this a more controversial formulation: once ǯǡǯǤ We will see why this is controversial. 
3. Fiction, more or less ǯce claim in a moment but 
now I want to comment on the idea of fictional status.  How fine grained can these 
distinctions within the category fictional status get? Should we think of this as something 
that comes in degrees, which we could represent, probability like, with a continuous 
variable between 0 and 1, with pure nonfiction and pure fiction as the respective end ǫǯǣǯ
that, or that this is very (slightly) fictional.  We do say that this is mostly fiction, that it 
contains a significant amount of fiction, that it is an unusual mixture of fiction and 
nonfiction. But these judgements are not, I think, ones of strict quantity, allowing us to 
say that fictional status is a mon      ǲ  ǳǤ     significance of what is said, which is a 
matter of content. Everything depends on the particularities of the work: two works with 
the same proportions of fictive/nonfictive utterance intentions but with quite different 
story-contents might get quite different fictionality ratings. We might put one on the 
fiction shelves and the other somewhere else.  
Should that bother me? No. Recall, my claim is that works produced by utterances with 
the same mix of fictive and assertive intentions are productive of works with the same 
degrees of fictionality. That does not mean ǲǳǤ   ǲ   the very same  ǳǡ
where a communicative intention is fully specified in terms, not only of the intended 
response to the communicative content, but the identity of content. Intending someone 
to imagine that it is raining is a different intention, for our purposes, from intending 
someone to imagine that it is snowing.   
Note that supervenience theses are in a sense extremely weak. Take ours: all it specifies 
is some of the conditions under which we should say the same thing about the fictionality 
of two works.15 It does not tell us what we should say about their fictionality. (Compare: 
the claim that the mental supervenes on the physical does not tell us what physical 
condition is a supervenience base for being in pain.) Suppose we know everything there 
                                          
15 Some, and not all. It is compatible with supervenience (and very likely true) that two works with quite 
different intentional profiles will have the same fictional status, just as two biologically distinct entities may 
have the same total mental state.  
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is to know about the fictive status of the utterances productive of some work F. We may 
still be entirely unclear about what weightings to give to distinct utterances within this 
class; we might even be locked in disagreement about what weightings to give and hence 
about whether, as a whole, the work is best classified as fiction or as non-fiction. The 
supervenience thesis will not help us resolve any of these issues. What it does say is that, 
whatever weightings we give in this case we must give also in the case of any other work 
with the same intentional profile, and where we disagree about the status of this work, 
we must reproduce that exact same disagreement in the case of any other work with the 
same intentional profile.16  
We may strengthen the Intentionalist theory by adding to the Supervenience thesis a 
couple ofȄI hopeȄuncontroversial claims concerning extreme cases: Where the 
illocutionary profile is uniformly fictive, the work is fiction; where it is completely not 
fictive, the work is nonfiction. Those are the easy cases. How should we think about the 
harder cases, where the illocutionary profile of F is non-uniform?  
One answer would be to opt for a kind of relativism. In cases where there is an uneven 
profile, we leave it to individuals to decide what to say about the fictionality of the work, 
and there are no right or wrong answers outside the extreme cases. But there is a 
constraint on indiviǯǢȋǡ
attributions) must respect supervenience, just as a person who judges this case to be 
immoral ought to judge a case which is naturalistically similar in every relevant qualitative 
respect as just as immoral and in just the same way. This way of understanding 
supervenience shows why my earlier formulation-- once you fix the facts about the ǯǡǯȄis 
controversial. For the relativistic interpretation denies that we are fixing facts and claims 
we are fixing only the opinions of individuals.  
This kind of relativism is surely too extreme. Someone who identifies just one assertive 
intention behind Anna Karenina (productive of its first sentence about happy and 
unhappy families) but who wants to insist that this is enough to make it predominantly 
nonfiction by weighting is surely wrong, even if they are willing to make the same 
judgement about any other work with the same intentional profile. Without denying the 
possibility of irresolvable disagreements we ought to be able to be able to identify cases 
of erroneous judgements of fictional status for works with non-uniform intentional 
profiles. And surely we can.  Take another case of supervenience. We know first-order 
formalisations of arithmetic do not capture the standard model, since no such 
                                          
16Note also how demanding the antecedent of a supervenience claim generally is. Take a simple version of 
physicalism: persons physically the same are mentally the same. But physical sameness requires qualitative 
indistinguishability down to the level of elementary particles. Similarly, our supervenience thesis about 
fiction allows us to conclude that works have the same fictional status only when we know that they are 
the product of communicative intentions which are sequentially identical both in the content of what is 
intended to be communicated and the intended effect of that content. Of course, the absurd strength of a 
supervenience ǯǤ
condition but the claim that the physical supervenes on the mental is (very likely) false.   
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formalisation has every arithmetical truth as a theorem. Yet two systems syntactically 
alike will be semantically alike in this sense: something is a model of the one just in case 
it is a model of the other. So I wish to understand the supervenience thesis for fictional 
status as telling us, similarly, that what sameness with respect to intentional profile 
guarantees is sameness with respect to the class of legitimate judgments concerning 
fictional status. In some cases, perhaps, this will be a unit class.  
4. Supervenience, strong and weak 
There are further choices to be made in interpreting the supervenience thesis. In 
particular there is a well-known choice between formulations of distinct logical 
strengths. These formulations have been subject to searching analysis, mainly by Jagwon 
Kim, which have exposed some difficulties in the simplifying assumptions needed for a 
straightforward statement of the options.17 But for present purposes I will offer a schema ǲǳ
supervenience: 
S    If anything x, in any possible world w, has a certain intentional profile P and a 
certain fictional status F, then anything in any possible world, different from or 
the same as w, also with P, will have F.  
The important point to note is that this is a claim to the effect that two things which are 
intentionally the same, even in otherwise completely different circumstances, will be the 
same with respect to fictionality. In other words, there are no background, contextual 
conditions which have to hold concerning the two object for their sameness with respect 
to intentional profile to guarantee their sameness with respect to fictionality.18 
In particular, this strong formulation rules out the possibility of understanding 
supervenience in an historically or culturally relative way. So to say, for instance, that 
supervenience holds, so long as we are thinking about works within the same culture 
(however narrowly or broadly defined), would be to say something weaker than what I 
am claiming. Nor would it be consistent with S to say that works within a given genre will 
satisfy the supervenience claim, but that works in different genres which are the same 
with respect to intentional profile may differ in fictionality. 
Many people will say that S is too strong, though they have some sympathy with the idea 
that intentional profile determines fictionality within some contextually given 
constraints. They may point to the fact (if it is a fact) that standards of historical 
responsibility and accuracy have changed and that works were once counted  as history 
which we would now count as fictional, or at least as less historical and more fictional 
than they previously were regarded. Take cases of a kind to which Stacie Friend has 
                                          
17 See papers in Part 1 of his Supervenience and Mind, CUP.  
18 This does not rule out there being background contextual factors which contribute to their having the 
same intentional profile, but that is another matter.  
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drawn attention.19 People used to think differently about the category history; in the time 
of Tacitus they were more tolerant than we are of narrative elements which were rather 
obviously invented or at best speculated about; works with that degree of invention we 
would not easily call history, though we might think of them as partially history or 
history-like. Can we really afford to claim that we are right and they are wrong, which is 
what we presumably would have to say if we insisted on the supervenience thesis I am 
offering.20 ǡǯǲȋȌǳǫ 
I agree it sounds that way. If they are really counterexamples to strong supervenience (S), 
we might try for a weaker supervenience thesis. There are many options here but the one 
most directly comparable with 1 would be this: 
W Works with the same intentional profile in a given world will have the same 
fictional status in that world. ǲǳǡ
think there is something to the accusation.21 But for present purposes it is probably 
enough to observe that a weak thesis would not provide us with the basis for an 
intentional theory of fiction, because weak supervenience theses allow that something    ǯ       Ǥ  
seems to be a modally respectable weak supervenience thesis: two sentences with the 
same meaning, produced in a given world, will have the same truth value in that world. 
Does that sustain the idea that truth depends only on meaning?22 Of course not: truth 
depends on the facts as well. The retreat to weak supervenience would leave us able to 
say, at most, that intentional profile and something else, determines fictional status.   
5. When are things flat? 
I think we can explain the Tacitus case and others like it without abandoning strong 
supervenience. I begin with another case of supervenience. Notoriously, very little if 
anything is literally flat. Yet the notion is an important one we use all the time and about 
the application of which we agree a great deal. We say that paintings differ from 
sculptures in that the former are flat, though of course we know that paintings have 
uneven surfaces. We complain that the road or the writing surface is not flat enough. We 
say that bowling surfaces are flatter than freeways. Now surely there is a sense in which 
                                          
19        	ǣ Ǯ 	  	ǯǤ    
Katherine Thomson-Jones (eds.), New Waves in Aesthetics. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 150-69; ǲFict    ǳǡ Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (2011): 163-180; ǲ	ǳǡProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (2012): 179Ȃ209. 
20 Strictly speaking the supervenience thesis would be consistent with the supposition that they are right 
and we are wrong, but I take that combination to be ruled out on grounds of pragmatic paradox. 
21 See Simon Blackburn, "Supervenience Revisited," in Ian Hacking, ed., Exercises in Analysis: Essays by 
Students of Casimir Lewy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 47-67. 
22       ǲSupervenieǳǡ Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/supervenience/#4.1 
9 
 
 
the flatness of a surface (whether or not it is flat and if it is, how flat it is) supervenes on 
something else, namely the exact geometry of the surface as you might represent it 
analytically in three dimensions. We might disagree about whether something is flat or 
how flat it is, or not be sure whether it is flat, or think that it is indeterminate whether it 
is flat or not. But once we have agreed that these two surfaces have the exact same 
equation in analytic geometry, we surely have to agree that whatever we say, however 
complicated, about the flatness of the one we should say about the flatness of the other. 
That sounds like the view that flatness strongly supervenes on the geometry of the 
surface: independent of any contextual background factors, two things with the same 
geometrical profȋǲ
is right to say about how flat or non-ǳȌǤ 
And that seems correct. If we are comparing two surfaces and we find them analytically 
the same it would be wrong to argue about which one is flatter than the other. But 
consider judgements of flatness arising in somewhat different circumstances. Suppose 
we consider two surfaces with the same analytical geometry, but produced in different 
ways in different communities. In one there are only relatively crude methods of shaping 
surfaces available, while in the other techniques are more refined. As a result, people in 
the first community judge their sample of surface as flat while people in the second ǯȄthey have higher, more demanding standards of what counts as flat. But if you 
brought the two communities together and got them to compare their surfaces they 
would agree, surely, that they are equally flatȄit would be bizarre to say that, of two 
surfaces point-for-point identical in bumpiness, one is flatter than the other. Or imagine 
that the two communities have equally good methods for making things flat but that they 
wish to put the two surfaces to different uses. One of them wants to use theirs for bowling 
balls along, while the other wants to use theirs as a road surface for trucks. One can 
imagine again that they would make different, but appropriate judgements about the 
flatness of these two surfacesȄa surface flat for trucks is not necessarily flat for bowling 
ballsȄwhile being willing to acknowledge, if they were brought together, that there is in 
fact no difference in the flatness of their surfaces.23 The people in these two communities 
would not, in such cases, be denying the supervenience of flatness on geometry. But ǡǡǯgment in the matter was 
wrong. What they are both saying about the flatness of their own surface is entirely 
appropriate to their circumstancesǢ       ǯ   ng 
would be misleading.  
                                          
23      ȋǲǳǡǤǤȋȌCreations of the Mind, Oxford University Press, 2007. ǯ Sprite as water, though much we do count as water turns out to 
contain no more actual water proportionately than SpriteȄpond water, for example. Bloom suggests that 
we are driven by considerations of artefactuality: Sprite has non-water deliberately mixed with water in ǯǤ
of pond water contained materials in exactly the Sprite-proportions; it is unlikely that anyone who had the 
chemical facts in question explained to them would say that the Sprite and the pond water differed in 
wateriness. 
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If this is right then it would seem that when we compare objects for flatness we look only 
at their geometriesȄwe treat flatness as strongly supervenient on geometry. But when 
we make judgments about the flatness of single surfaces which are sensitive to the use of 
those things we take other things into account. But our doing that, for those purposes, 
does not falsify the claim that flatness supervenes on analytical geometry.  
The question is then whether we should treat the notion of fiction in the same way as this. 
My present suggestion is that we can. Here is an illustration of how, based on an example 
Stacie Friend gives, though her conclusions about the case are different from mine.  
Returning to an earlier example. It is possibǯ
the Annals are very much non-fiction, whereas we would regard it as nonfiction but only 
roughly or marginally so. Suppose that is true. Would that be evidence against the 
supervenience claim? We can see now that it might not be. For it would be available to us 
to say that the disagreement here is a pragmatic one. Arguably, standards of historical 
fidelity and responsibility have improved over time, just as tools for making things flat 
have got better. And just as people with better tools make more demanding judgements 
of flatness, so people with more demanding standards of historical responsibility make 
more demanding judgements about whether something is fiction or non-fiction, or about 
the extent to which it is central or marginal for either of those two categories. ǯ	
might call pure and pragmatic judgements of fictionality: the fact that different people at 
different times make different judgements about the fictionality of works with the same 
illocutionary profile (and, in the case just described, different judgments about the 
fictionality of the same work) does not refute the supervenience claim which is at the    ǯ ǡ         
factorsȄin this case changes in standards of historical responsibilityȄwhich account for 
the different judgements.  
Friend also offers a number of objections to the Intentional theory which are best 
understood, I think, as variations on a single theme: that there is in general a mismatch 
between, on the one hand, what we judge to be fiction and fictive intention and, on the 
other, what we judge to be nonfiction and assertive intention. Thus she points out that  
The class of works that invite make-believe or imagining is substantially broader 
than our ordinary notion of fiction. Anyone who reads Ernest ShackletoǮSouth 
(1920), an account of his failed expedition to Antarctica, without imagining the 
terrible odyssey that  unfolded after his ship was crushed by ice has simply not 
engaged properly with the story. Vividly told non-fiction narratives invite us to 
imagine what it was like for people to live in different times and places, to undergo 
wonderful or horrible experiences, and so on. 
But this pointȄwith which I entirely agreeȄis no objection to the supervenience claim, 
which does not commit us to the idea that nonfictional works are free from invitations to 
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imagine. Nor is it committed to the corresponding principle for fictionsȄǲǳȄ	ǯǣ 
ǮMary Barton ǣǮ some fields ǡȆ
	ǡ            ǯǥǤ 
statement is not only true, it was intended to be true and any informed reader of 
Gaskell will believe it.24 
To repeat, the supervenience thesis does not say that fictional works are the products of 
wholly fictive utterances while non-fiction ones are wholly the product of assertive ones. ǯl profile, we fix its fictional status. 
6. Is this Intentionalism too weak? 
At this point it will be said that I am evading criticism of the Intentional theory by opting 
for an extremely weak version of it. To this I make two responses. The first agrees that 
the supervenience thesis is weakȄI have said as muchȄbut goes on to make the point 
that even weak Intentionalism is Intentionalism, and that this appears to be a version of     	ǯ Ǥ        
Intentionalism by supplementing the supervenience thesis with other principles. For ǡ         ǣ ǲ resence of a fictive ǯ
fiction, while the presence of an assertive intention in the profile tends to support the 
judgement that the work is non-ǳǤ 
Several things need to be said by way of interpretations of this principle, all of them Ǥ	ǡǲǳǡ
have in mind an analogy with attributions of certain aesthetic properties. Thus it is said ǲǳtend to support the judgement that the work concerned 
is of positive aesthetic merit, though they need not always do so, since the desired effect 
of certain works calls for harsh, squat or otherwise ungraceful forms.25 Also, the degree 
of tending will vary considerably from case to case because, as I have said, some 
individual communicative intentions (think of them, for the sake of simplicity, as 
intentions to communicate single sentences) will be more important than others so far as ǯǤlso, their importance will be determined holisticallyȄ
partly, that is, in virtue of their connections with other communicative intentions 
associated with the same work. Finally, while there will be differences between the 
degrees of tending of distinct individual communicative intentions, the degree of tending 
of any one of them is likely to be very small; to point to any one sentence in a text and 
declare it to be the product of a fictive or an assertive intention is almost never going to 
                                          
24 ǲ	ǳǤ 
25 See Sibley, ǲǳǡPhilosophical Review, 68 (1959): 421-450. 
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ǲǳ
versa; at most it would move it marginally up or down the scale.  
All that said, this supplementary principle seems to me to have a good deal of appeal, 
which we can bring out in the following way. Suppose the two of you are arguing about 
whether a work should be regarded as fiction or not. If you think that the work should be 
regarded as fiction, would you ever cite in support of that the fact that a particular 
sentence in the work was the product of an assertive intention? If you think that the work 
should be regarded as nonfiction, would you ever cite in support of that the fact that a 
particular sentence in the work was the product of a fictive intention? The answer in both ǲǳǤ 
7. Higher order intentions 
There is another objection offered by Friend to which I would like to respond, but at this 
point I need to somewhat complicate the picture by considering some communicative 
intentions an author might have which are not associated with specific utterances but 
which, as it were, form the background to them, and which one would have to take into 
account in order properly to assess the fictionality of the whole work. So the intentional 
profile of a work will include not only the utterance-specific intentions we have been 
dealing with until now, but additionally such higher-order intentions as the intention to 
convey such and such a serious message by conveying these fictive intentions. 
Presumably Jesus had certain higher-order intentions of this kind in telling the parables; 
he manifests a fictive intention in telling of the Samaritan who helps one injured by 
robbers, and in so doing, manifests an intention to testify to his questioner that someone 
far removed from your own community is your neighbour.26 
With that in mind consider the passage below cited by Friend from an opinion piece in 
the New York Times with its invitation to imagine a scenario for future conflict in Sudan: 
JAN. 18 The South declares that 91 percent of voters have chosen secession. The 
North denounces the vote, saying it was illegal, tainted by violence and fraud, and 
invalid because the turnout fell below the 60 percent threshold required.  
JAN. 20 The South issues a unilateral declaration of independence.  
JAN. 25 Tribal militias from the North sweep through South Sudan villages, killing 
and raping inhabitants and driving them south. The governor of a border state in 
the North, Ahmad Haroun, who is wanted by the International Criminal Court for 
war crimes and organizing the janjaweed militia in Darfur, denies that he is now 
doing the same thing in the South. 
 Since we are being asked to imagine this (I agree with Friend here) this cannot, she says, 
be categorised as non-fiction by an Intentional. Why would anyone want to categorise 
                                          
26 ǲBut he, willing to justify himself, said unto Jesus, And who is my neighbour?ǳȋǡ ? ?Ǥ ? ?ȌǤ 
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itȄthis passage, that isȄas non-fiction? It is, surely, an imaginative story, not intended 
to be believed and I have no difficulty categorizing it, taken in isolation, as fiction. But we 
might want to take it in conjunction with the rest of the text, much of which is 
argumentative, and with unarticulated propositions which are nonetheless 
communicated by the text. We are not meant merely to imagine this scenario; we are 
intended to have certain beliefs about it: that, for example, this is the sort of thing which 
will probably happen if the administration does not take a tough line with the Sudanese 
government. Manifestly, the imaginative story is told not because of its own intrinsic 
interest or merit but because it serves the furtherance of an argument which, along with 
a certain amount of implicit testifying to the truth of propositions, constitutes the purpose 
of the article. The message behind the little fiction embedded in the text is itself a piece 
of testimonyȄthings as bad as these are likely to happen.  
In light of all we know about the communicative intentions behind this essay, including 
those concerning how its imaginative part is intended to serve wider purposes and what 
those purposes specifically are, it seems to me reasonable to say that it is primarily non-
fictional in intent  and to say, when pushed to give an all-up judgment, that it is ǲǳǤ
all that stuff in A la Recherche du Temps Perdue, though I am not inclined to call the result 
nonfiction. Why not? For one thing, the opinion piece manifests an urgency and 
definiteness with respect to the testimonial component that is lacking in the case of ǡǯ fictive intentions it 
manifests. The mix of intentions manifest in the NYT piece is quite different from that we 
would typically find in the production of a detective story or even a Proustian novel, 
where the story-telling intentions, while they relate to certain implicitly communicated 
bits of testimony, certainly seem more to the fore, more significant and self-justifying 
than do the story telling intentions manifested in the NYT piece.  
Of course I have been appealing, in this argument about the NYT piece, to much more than 
supervenience. I have made a number of judgements about the weighting of elements 
within the textȄjudgements which do not follow from the supervenience thesis. 
Someone might dispute these judgements and the argument that follows might resolve 
part or all of the dispute. The situation is somewhat like that which has been said to hold 
of aesthetic judgement. We think that the evaluative properties we ascribe in making 
aesthetic judgements are supervenient, but we acknowledge that we cannot mechanically 
infer those properties from whatever we take them to supervene on. Aesthetic attribution 
is a matter of, exactly, judgement, and so, on the theory I have been outlining, are 
judgements about fictionality.  
8. New problems for Intentionalism? 
So far I have been defending the Intentionalist theory. But the way I have formulated it, 
in terms of strong supervenience, brings into focus certain worrying features to which I 
now draw attention. Tȋǯ
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concession) announced early on. I said that the intentional profile of a work includes a 
full specification of the content of what the utterer wants to convey and not merely a 
specification of whether the utterer wants the hearer to believe or to imagine the content. 
And the reason for this was that the content of what is conveyed is obviously relevant to 
deciding the significance of any particular bit of text (a sentence, say) and significance is ǯǤǤ
We have a text with 100 sentences in it, and we construct an intentional profile for the 
work, giving a specification of the communicative intention behind each sentence, and 
come up with an intentional profile which contains 50 instances of fictive intentions and 
50 instances assertive ones. What should we say about the place of this work on the scale 
of fictionality?  Surely we cannot say anything unless we understand what was meant. 
Where we decide to put the work on the fictive scale will be influenced by the significance 
for the overall discourse that the work represents of each. Fifty narratively trivial 
sentence weigh much less that fifty narratively significant ones. 
The worry I want to highlight is that there are factors that contribute to weighting ǯǤ
kinds: one is factors that contribute to content (and hence to weighting) without being 
determined by authorǯs intentions; the other are factors that contribute to weighting but 
without contributing to content, and without being determined by authorǯs intentions. So ǯǣǡ-content factors respectively. 
Trouble with content factors arises when we consider the role of implicatures in 
determining content. Grice distinguished between conventional and non-conventional 
implicatures, while among the latter he discussed in any detail only conversational 
implicatures. Also, the category of conventional implicatures is somewhat controversial, ȋǲǳȌǤ
Grice seems to have thought of implicatures as dependent on intention; a hearer might 
think that something was implicatedȄmight think it implicated that the speaker has only ǲǳȄbut this will not be implicated if the 
speaker did not intend to convey that she had only two children.27 If that is so then what ǯ
intentional profile will not differ with respect to implicature. And the worry that 
differences of implicature may lead to differences of content and hence to differences in 
fictional status would be avoided. But is it really plausible that implicature is wholly 
intention dependent? Is it easy to argue  that in many contexts at least, the woman who  ǲ   ǳ  ate that she has only two, though she does not 
intend this implication, because a fully rational and appropriately informed hearer would 
naturally conclude that this is part of what was communicated by the utterance.  One 
might want respond by distinguishing between intention-dependent and intention-
                                          
27 That is how Stephen Neale reads the situat 
ǯ ǲǳconsideration ǲǤǤǤǤǤǤ
[the utterer] implicates is part of what U means, and... what U means is determined by ǯǳȋǲ
ǳǡǤ ? ?ȌǤ 
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independent implicatures, but if we allow a kind of implicature which is intention-
independent, that is the kind of implicature that is going to be most relevant to the ǯǤ	 is natural to say that what ends up as part of the 
story cannot depend on private facts about the speaker unavailable to well-placed and 
rational readers; that is the sensible kernel of the otherwise unacceptable idea that an ǲǳns when we try to understand a literary work.  
If we allow that implicatures may be intention-independent, what sort of factors does this 
mean we will have to admit as contributing to the determination of content? The answer ǲǳǤthe following exchange. 
Q: Is Smith tall? 
A: He is five foot two 
Has A given an answer? Yes, if what is said implicates something about whether Smith is 
tall or not. But what is implicated? If, as a matter of fact, being five foot two is distinctly 
not being tall, then it is implicated that Smith is not tall. But not otherwise. So the average 
height of male humans is capable of influencing content. Or: 
Q: Is he a good dancer? 
A: Was Gene Kelly a good dancer?  
It is easy to see that just about any fact, taken into the presupposition set for the 
conversation, can generate or block an implicature.  
I turn now to non-content factors. I will consider just one. Recall that the question is 
whether there are non-content factors relevant to determining the weightings that we 
give to utterances productive of a work and which therefore help to determine its 
intentional profile. And when it comes to imagining, there is much we can say that goes 
beyond content. In particular judgements of fictionality can be thought of as rationally 
sensitive to the intensity of the imaginings they provoke. And this is not a matter of 
intended intensity, for writers simply may not have intentions concerning intensity of 
imaging, and if they do it is extremely difficult for them to make those intentions manifest 
to their audience; intentions about the intensity of imaginings are rarely communicative 
intentions.    
To understand the idea of intensity of imagining, consider a familiar question: what is the 
difference between, on the one hand, imagining something and, on the other merely 
assuming, supposing or considering it.28   ǲǳǤ 
view: to imagine is to entertain, to attend to, to consider. These are things we do 
whenever we have some proposition in mind. But, says Walton, this is not imagining, 
which is more active than any of these things are: Imagining is doing something with a 
proposition one has in mind. Tamar Gendler takes a similar view, arguing that 
                                          
28 ǯȋȌǤ 
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ǲǤǤǤǤ
What this suggests is that imagination is distinct from belief on the one hand, and from ǳǤ29 On her view the kind of participation that imagining 
requires is responsible for our being resistant to imagining certain thingsȄslavery being 
morally right, for example. But supposing is non-participatory and we no difficulty 
supposing, for the sake of the argument, that slavery is morally right.  ǯǤ
suggestion, due to Neil van Leeuven: that recent thinking about the imagination has not 
sufficiently emphasised the role of perceptual imagery  ǯ  ǡ
having been largely focused on propositional imaginingȄwhich is what I have been 
talking about so far. (In this I am as guilty as anyone.) And the thought is that we see a 
difference between barely imagining somethingȄwhich now we are invited to think of 
as a case of occurent understanding or contemplationȄand the kind of elaborated and 
intense imagining which is, in various ways, more than bare imagining. It is this 
elaborated imagining which we should think of as being typical or at least paradigmatic 
of our engagements with fiction.  And this imagining is elaborated in a number of ways. 
The first, as I have indicated, is through a close link with perceptual forms of imagine. We ǯǣ
wheels, we imagine the sound of the brakes, and we may proprioceptively simulate the 
act of falling. This is relevant partly because vǲThere is reason to 
think that imagining in, say, visual or auditory detail, has far greater emotional impact ǡǳǡthe very direct 
neural pathways from perceptual areas to the brains emotion centres.30  
This is one difference (or one category of difference) between imagination as 
understanding and fictive imagining. Another I will call degree of narrative density. The 
iǯ
to that point. Presumably I have followed a long (very long), narratively structured path 
of connected imaginings to this point in such a way that the shadows of prior imaginings 
continue to make themselves felt by enriching my perceptual imagery and, ǡǤǡǯ
think that when I imagine that P while being engrossed by some fictional story, and when 
I occurently comprehend P in an affectively neutral way, two quite different state-types 
are tokened. It could be instead that it is the tokening of states of the same type but in 
such radically different contexts and with other, different things going on as to give the 
impression of more difference between them than there is. For merely contemplating P 
is likely to be less enriched by perceptual imaginings (though some may still be present) 
and is likely to lack rich, narrative connections to other imaginings. 
                                          
29 GendlerǡǲǳǡJournal of Philosophy, 97 (2000): 55Ȃ81, see pp.80-81. 
30 ǲ     ǳǡ Journal of Philosophy 108(2011), 55- ? ?Ǥ    ǲ ǳ ȋȌ  Knowledge through Imagination, eds. A. Kind and P. Kung,  Oxford 
University Press 
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With these considerations in mind I am inclined to say that cases of entertaining, 
supposing and considering are also cases of imagining, but that imaginings can vary a 
good deal in certain respects. In particular, imaginings vary a good deal in their 
perceptual; and emotional intensity. And it is not plausible to suppose that our 
judgements about the fictional status of a work depend partly on the intensity of the 
imaginings they provoke. One additional thing to say in defence of the idea that the NYT 
article discussed earlier is, all things considered, nonfiction is that its description of the 
admittedly fictional scenario embedded in it is not apt to generate especially vivid 
imaginings. How much weighting one ought to give to this in particular cases is, once ǡǡǲǳǤ         ǯ   
bland or vivid, it is difficult to argue that a set of upper and lower limits to intensity (along 
all the dimensions that intensity might be measured on) can be extracted from the ǯǤǡ
non-content factors that are at once independent of  ǯ  
contributors to the determination of fictional status.31  
* 
If, as I suspect, these difficulties cannot be argued away, a friend of Intentionalism will 
have to retreat to something weaker than the supervenience thesis on display here, and 
that thesis is already a comparatively weak one. Of course it is weak as a thesis but strong 
as a supervenience thesis, so we might retreat to a version of weak supervenience. But by 
then we have given up, for weak supervenience theses do not embody the claim that it is 
only communicative intentions that determine fictional status. We may continue to insist 
that communicative intentions contribute, in some way, to fictional status, but that is a 
comparatively uninteresting claim.  
 
                                          
31 Stacie Friend, rejecting the Intentionalist theory, has urged us to see fiction as a genre. Genres are, she ǡ ǲ    ȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ  Ǯ  Ǯǳ ȋ ǡ ǲ  ǳǡ
Philosophical Review, 79 (1970): 334-69. ǯǡǯ
might be visually indistinguishable but aesthetically and artistically distinct because features of the one 
have a significance which corresponding features of the other lack.  What I am suggesting here is that two 
works of narrative art could be indistinguishable with respect to the intentional profile of their utterances 
but distinct in terms of fictionality, because utterances in the one have a significanceȄan imagistic or 
implicative powerȄwhich corresponding utterances in the other lack.  
 
